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the   task   of   conceptualizing   and   researching   the   topic.   Professional   historians,
especially  those  influenced  by  the  postcolonial  turn,  acknowledge  that  empires  take
varied forms and continue to shape political outcomes in the 21st century. By contrast,
a  number  of  their  colleagues   in  political  science  and   international  relations  are,  on
balance, seemingly more skeptical of the proposition that empires still exist. As a result
of   this   gap   in  perception  Biccum   suggests   that   there   is   a  need   “to  broaden   the
conversation between IR and postcolonial theory.”1 Saying that, there are still some in
the disciplines of political science and international relations, including a number of
political   theorists,  who  do  concede   that  empires  are  very  much  alive  and   that   the
United States fits into this category. 
2 Historians,  and  others,  especially   in   fields   including   sociology  and   literature,  have
produced a rich and nuanced discourse that carefully demonstrates that empires take
assorted forms, employ varied tactics and strategies in pursuit of their ambitions, and
did  not  disappear  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Second  World  War.  This  narrative  also
generally   accepts   that   the  United  States  has   evolved   an   empire   that   includes   its
westward  expansion  across  North  America,   its  pursuit  of  small  and  large  territories
outside  of   the  contiguous  United  States   (including  Alaska,  Hawai’i,   the  Philippines,
Cuba,   Puerto   Rico   and  more),   and   continues   to   use   novel   tactics,   including   the
acquisition of bases, economic pressure or cultural forms, to behave in ways that look
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Whilst  his  work  contends  that  this  message  is  not  controversial  among  historians  it
argues that it remains more controversial, however, in other parts of the academy. 
3 To  be  sure,  scholars   in  political  science  and   international  relations  often   take   the
opposite stance on these issues. Take, for example, the renewed debate over American
Empire  in  the  years  following  the  September  11,  2001  attacks  and  the  American  led
invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq. International Studies Perspectives, a journal of the
International  Studies  Association,  dedicated   space   in   the  August  2008   issue   to   the
consideration of an American empire. A quick perusal of this section makes plain that
most  contributors  do  not  believe  that  there   is  an  American  Empire.   Indeed,   in  this
section there is considerable resistance to the study of empire. This issue appeared at a
time when the United States was occupying both Iraq and Afghanistan not to mention
Washington’s  myriad  other  possessions,  ranging  from  bases  to  small  islands  to  large
islands,   i.e.,  Puerto  Rico.  Writing   in  2016,  Schumacher  notes,  “Over  the   last  decade,


















5 The  dissensus  between  some   individuals   in  these  academic  communities   is,   in  part,
inspired  by  the   lack  of  definitional  clarity  over  what  exactly  constitutes  an  empire.
According   to  Münkler:  “there   is  an  abundance  of  historical  accounts  of   individual
empires… but the question of what an empire is… has remained virtually unexamined…
Political  Science  has  not  provided  solid  definitions.”6 Biccum  similarly  contends  that
there is a “lack of consensus on the meaning of the term, a profound sense of confusion
and a dearth of systematic theorization”.7 Perhaps predictably this debate has tended
to  break  down  over  epistemological  traditions  and  disciplinary  divides.  Mainstream





sovereign  polity.  Colás,   for  example,  defines  an  empire  as  “any   single  polity   that
successfully expands from a metropolitan centre across various territories in order to
dominate   diverse   populations”.9 Hoganson   and   Sexton   point   out   that   “Historians
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generally  define  empire as  a  political  unit   that  encompasses  an  extensive  sweep  of
territory containing various peoples or polities.”10 Kramer, also a historian, uses a more
encompassingembracing  definition  when  he  writes,  “Here   the   imperial   refers   to  a
dimension of power in which asymmetries in the scale of political action, regimes of
spatial   ordering,   and   modes   of   exceptionalizing   difference   enable   and   produce
relations of hierarchy, discipline, dispossession, extraction, and exploitation.”11 
6 Many historians, as well as scholars and commentators in other disciplines, including
Go   in   sociology,   additionally   take   it   as   a   given   that   empires   endure   despite
decolonisation.12 These  approaches   tend   to  embrace  more  expansive  definitions  of
empire.  They  often  recognize  that  there  are  many  variants  of the  occurrence  in  the
contemporary  world,  including  informal  empire.  Postcolonialists,   in  particular,  have
focused  on  some  of  these   informal  processes,  recognizing  that  empire  entails  more
than   just   invading  armies  and  fluttering  foreign  flags.  Therefore,  the   latter  tend  to
focus   instead  on  the  dissemination  of  an   invasory  colonial  culture  that  stresses  the
superiority of the colonising power. As McLeod notes, “representations and modes of
perception  are  used  as   fundamental  weapons  of  colonial  power   to  keep  colonised
peoples subservient to  colonial  rule.”13 As Howe  subsequently  posits: “Should we  see
modern empires as first and foremost cultural phenomena, or as political or economic






7 Given   its   very   long   history   this   essay   cannot   fully   grapple   with   the   ontology,
historiography  and  epistemology  of  empire.  Nor,  given  time  and  space  constraints,
does it “write back” and give voice to those First Nation peoples displaced or silenced
by empire; but it does examine one critical question that is central to the debate over
the  continued  relevance  of  empire  as  a  concept:   is   the  United  States  an  empire?16
Taking account of its outsized role in global affairs, its westward expansion in the 18th
and  19th  centuries,   its  history  of  acquiring  overseas  possessions,   its   long-standing






















one   which   changes   forms   and   tack   along   the   way,   depending   on   context   and
technology, and is thus difficult to pin down.20 
 
2. Defining Empire: Confusion Reigns!
8 Much  of   the  debate  on   empire   stems   from   the  multiple   and  often   contradictory
definitions  assigned  to  empires.21 In  this  work,  it  should  go  without  saying  that  the
definitions   and   assumptions   tend   to   vary   by   field,  with   some  historians   starting
perhaps with more nuanced or qualitative understandings of the subject and those in
political  science  and  international  relations  approaching  the  topic  with  narrower  or
quantitative conceptions. Restrictive definitions, i.e., one polity gaining territory from
another polity through conquest, are helpful as they remain concise. They thus lend
themselves  easily  to  more  socially  scientific  approaches  as  these  narrow  taxonomies
conveniently rule out marginal cases and make it easier to falsify examples of empire.
Schake  suggests  that  treating  United  States  overseas  colonial  conquest  the  same  as
westwards expansion “isn’t useful” on the basis such an approach is too expansive.22
Nevertheless,  as  American  satirist  and  writer  H.  L.  Mencken  pointed  out   :  “There  is
always   a   well-known   solution   to   every   human   problem   –   neat,   plausible,   and









have   changed   and   evolved   their   tactics.25  Historians   Streets-Salter   and   Getz
subsequently emphasise  a need to  move  beyond conquest to  examine  “the thoughts,
doctrines, and ideologies” of empire.26 Similarly, Motyl, a political scientist cognizant of
some   of   the   imperial   nuances,   similarly   argues   that   scholars   interested   in
understanding   empire   need   to   move   away   from   just   invasion-focused   imperial




kind  of  basic,  consensus  definition  would  be  that  an  empire  is  a  large  political  body
which  rules  over  territories  outside  its  original  borders.”28 Formal  empires  based  on
military conquest and the occupation of foreign lands are thus universally recognized




mandate  or writ  by   international  organization.  They  are  also  beginning  to  question
notions of size (note Howe’s emphasis above above on “large”), as well as the focus on
Empire?




are  not   simply  one  polity  annexing  another  and  only  holding   formerly   sovereign
territory  via  conquest.  However,  much  work   remains   to  be  done  and   there   is  no
commonly accepted understanding of what exactly constitutes an empire. By extension
there   is  even   less  consensus  on  whether  or  not   the  United  States  qualifies  as  an










United   States  with   its   network   of   overseas   connections   at   present   does   not
constitute formal empire. It lacks the institutionalized authority relations of core








of   the  Ottoman  Empire?  After   all,   they  were  not  usually  occupied  by  permanent
Ottoman   forces?  The   threat   of  Ottoman  military   intervention  was,   though,   often
enough to deter these actors from breaking with the regime in Constantinople. Similar
arrangements  have  existed  all  over  the  world   for  thousands  of  years,  and  are  best
understood   in   the   context   of   informal   empire.   Informal   empire   is   defined   as   a
relationship between a more powerful polity and a weaker one in which the former has




through   institutions   such  as   imperial   consuls.”33 But  as   the  previously  mentioned
Ottoman case makes clear it is possible for an empire to simultaneously be formal in
some parts and informal in others. 





what  constitutes  France’s  original  border  seems  difficult  at  best  and   impossible  at
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12 While  Artois   is  relatively  obscure   this  kind  of  case   is  commonplace  and  reflects  a
fundamental  truth  in  international  politics:  borders  are  not  static.  To  take  a  similar






war.”34 Yet   despite   having   been   invaded   by   the  United   States   and   being   under
occupation for a mere 43 years (compared with Artois’ nearly 300 years of French rule),
the   Japanese   assault   on   Pearl  Harbour  was   considered   an   infamous   attack   upon
American  soil.  As  Immerwahr  documents,  Japan  attacked  not  only  Pearl  Harbor  but
additionally  a  host  of  other  American  colonial possessions,  including  the  Philippines,
Guam, Midway Island and Wake Islands.35 Former President Roosevelt declared, after
hearing news of the attack on Hawai’i, "Always we will remember the character of the





governmental   operations   in  Hawaii…   the   subject   tends   to   be   avoided   by  Hawaii





13 Another   area   of   confusion,   one   related   to   boundaries,   revolves   around   trying   to
differentiate  between  nation-states  and  empires.  Streets-Salter  and  Getz  argue  that
empires  occur  when  a  polity  “comes   to  exert  control  over  other  states  or  peoples
without fully integrating them.”38 Others, including Immerwahr, have noted that the
United  States  has   a   long  history  of   such  behavior,   e.g,  Puerto  Rico.39 Once   these
conquered  peoples  have  been   assimilated   some   suggest   that   empires   cease  being
empires and evolve into states. Colás, a professor of International Relations, proposes
that  modern   state   formation,   symbolised  by   fixed  boundaries/frontiers  and   liberal
internationalism which “actively seeks to promote self-government, civil liberties and
Empire?




violence  are   intrinsic  to   imperial  rule   in  a  way  which   is  not  true  of  other  political
orders.”41 But  such  a  position  only  further  confounds  our  understanding  of  empire.
Firstly, empires can also try to fix their boundaries permanently, as occurred under the
Roman Emperor  Augustus at the  Rhine and Danube  Rivers in the  1st  century  AD.  So
fixed   borders   are   not   unique   to   nation-states.   Secondly,   modern   nation-state
boundaries are themselves not necessarily as fixed or as collaborative as Colás makes
out. Nazi Germany was a nation-state but that did not stop it wanting to invade both





formerly   under   imperial   rule   without   creating   new   minorities,   injustices   and
repression.”43 
14 Therefore,  by  emphasizing   such  distinctions  between  nation-states  and  empires   it
seems   too  easy   to   forget  how  or  when  a  particular  nation   state  was   formed.  The
Samoan  writer  Albert  Wendt  drew   attention   to   this   incongruity   in  history  when
discussing   this   silencing  of   the   indigenous  voice:  “...look  at   the  way  New  Zealand
history has been constructed. It has been constructed by the colonizers who took over
this country, and write it to suit themselves. Their histories are their version of things,
and  they  do  not  want  other  competing  versions.”  (Albert  Wendt,  qtd.   in  Ellis  83).44
Kumar, a sociologist, also comments upon these paradoxes when he says that there are
“significant similarities between nation-states and empires. Many nation-states are in










some  kind   of  physical   control   of   lands  beyond   its   original  borders.  This   tension
illustrates another critical divide in the study of empire: formal versus informal. Formal
empires   tend   to   closely   match   Howe’s   definition   and   are   almost   always   easily
recognized  by   fluttering   imperial   flags  and  marching   troops.  By  contrast,   informal
empires involve arrangements other than formal annexation of territory and are more
contentious. In the Ottoman case the relationship between the imperial policy and the
subjugated  areas  is  perhaps  best  called  suzerainty.  Once  a  common  way  of  thinking
about political and imperial organization the term has largely died in recent decades.
In 1899 Wallwyn P.B. Shepheard, writing in a legal journal, defined it thus:









to   settle  whether  any  given  relations  established  by  a   treaty  may  be  property
referred to as suzerainty.48 
16 Well   over   a   century   later,   and  despite   the   fading   of   suzerainty   as   a   concept   in
international relations, Shepheard’s conceptualization remains useful and important.
The words have changed, i.e., hegemony replacing suzerainty in the literature, but the
concept   closely  matches  more   inclusive  definitions  of   empire,   especially   informal
empire.  Indeed,  both  terms  suggest  power  disparities  and  the  ability  of  one  actor  to





relationship  between  them.  Most  pro-empire  commentators  suggest  that  empire,
hegemony, and imperialistic activity are logically and historically intertwined.50
17 Ferguson  notes  that  hegemony  in  its  classical  meaning  sprang  from  an  Athenian-led
and relatively voluntary anti-Persian alliance.51 That, at least, is the official position as
outlined  in  Herodotus,  the   ‘father  of  history’.  Intriguingly,  this  alliance  soon  turned















a  vast  network  of   imperial  possessions   in   the  Pacific.56 Worth   (2015)  offers  a  near
exhaustive accounting of the definitions of hegemony but his analysis underscores the
many  and  different  ways  in  which  the  term  is  used.57 On  some  level,  many  of  these
terms   are   perhaps   interchangeable;   but   this   question   of   nomenclature,   while
problematic,  only  serves  to  bring  us  back  to  where  we  started,  namely  the   lack  of
agreement   over  how   to  define   and  understand   empire,   and  now   also  hegemony,
informal empire and suzerainty. 
18 Part  of   the  confusion  over   the  status  of   the  United  States   is   the  narrow   focus  on
conquest as the primary mechanism through which polities may expand into empires.




for  this  to  happen  and  these  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  They   include:  marriage  /
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3. An Empire in Denial?
19 Because  empires  form  and  expand   in  multiple  ways  there   is  no  consensus  on  what
constitutes an empire. This confusion makes it more possible for many to not view the
United States as an empire. The literature does, however, show that there are generally
two  ways  of differentiating  empire  from  non-empire.  The  first  is  structural,  i.e.,  one
polity  acquiring  (via whatever  means  -  though  often  conquest,  war,  or  conflict)  land
outside  of  its  original  borders.  This  generally  matches  formal  empire.  The  second  is




both  means.60 These   two  methods  of  acquiring  empire  are  not  mutually  exclusive,
however. Lundestad argues that the United States, at the behest of its allies, formed a
series  of  both   formal  and   informal  arrangements  this  way   in  post-war  Europe  that
some consider imperial.61 
20 The literature on American empire shows that the United States, using conquest and




driving   force  behind   the  Revolution,   then   the  very  act  of  American   independence
might have also been itself an imperial first move. According to Ostler:
Jefferson’s  denigration  of  “merciless   Indian   savages”   signaled   that   the  war   for
independence  from  Great  Britain  would  also  be  a  brutal  war  to  seize  indigenous
lands. From 1776 to 1783, U.S. troops and colonial militias destroyed more than 70
Cherokee towns, 50 Haudenosaunee towns, and at least 10 multiethnic towns in the





dismiss  entirely  the  idea  that  their  country  was  ever  an  empire:  “When  the  average
American  thinks  of   ‘colonialism’,  or  of  the  Colonial  Powers,  he  is  apt  to  confine  his
thoughts to European ‘colonialism.’”63 Finlay makes a similar argument when he writes







1970s,  have  been  much  more  willing  to  accept  that  the  United  States   is  an  empire.
Historians,   including  Williams  and  LaFeber,  have  made   the  case   for   the  American
empire.66 More  recently  Ferguson,  O’Reilly,   Johnson,  and  others  have  attempted   to
Empire?





that   the  United   States has   relied   upon  multiple  means   of   expansions,   including
purchase  and  lease  (as  opposed  to  solely  relying  on  conquest),  and  by  elite  political
rhetoric which almost often loudly denies that Washington is imperial. 
22 Frymer demonstrates that the United States during its territorial expansion in the 18th
and   19th  centuries   behaved   similarly   to   states   that  were   unabashedly   imperial. 68
Hopkins, considering the 20th century, provides comparable evidence that the United
States, through its foreign policies, behaved in ways that often looked imperial.69 Thus,
for   some   scholars,   it   is  clear   that   the  United  States  has  always  been  an   imperial
enterprise   though   the  mechanisms  of   imperial  growth  and  maintenance  may  have
shifted.  During  the  18th and  19 th centuries  many  European  powers  were  trumpeting
their   imperial  status.  The  United  States  frequently  engaged   in  similar  behavior  but
often,   though  not  always,  denied   its  empire  and  cloaked   itself   in   the   language  of
democracy,   freedom  and   republicanism.   Indeed,  Washington  disguised   its   imperial
expansion by using less overt language to describe its political development. While it is
undeniable   that   the  United  States   led  various  campaigns  of  conquest  against  First
Peoples  over  a   long  period  of  time  these  campaigns  are  often  not  billed  as  wars  or
conquests but rather as ‘removals’.70
23 Moreover,   the  history  of   the  United   States   is   replete  with   expansions  outside  of
conquest,  especially  via purchase  and   lease.  Some  of  those  were  truly  exchanges  of




did  eventually  pay  Spain   in  exchange  for   land  the  outcome  only  came  after  United
States forces had essentially conquered most of that territory. Later, after the Spanish
American  War,   in  which  Washington   acquired  Cuba,   Puerto  Rico,  Guam   and   the







acquisition  (with  some  being  conquest,  others  being  real  purchases  and  others  still
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To  many  Americans,   it   is   inconceivable   that   their   country,   born   in   anticolonial
struggle,  could  be  an  empire.”74 Indeed,  the  United  States  was  born   in  a  revolution
against an overtly imperial state and takes considerable pride in being a republic and a
democracy. Presidential rhetoric too has denied the existence of an American empire,




lives   for   freedom.”75 This  message   is   entirely   compatible  with  George  W.  Bush’s
proclamation  that  “We  have  no  desire  to  dominate,  no  ambitions  of  empire.”76 The
claims  of  the  42nd and  43 rd presidents  are  not  novel.  Ronald  Reagan,   in  a  Cold  War
flourish, drew the distinction between “free” Americans and “imperial” Russians when
he  labelled  the  Soviet  Union  an  “evil  empire.”77 Straining  credulity  Lyndon  Johnson
discussed  American   foreign  policy   in  Vietnam  saying:  “It   is  not  conquest;   it   is  not
empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination.”.78 While these are isolated quotes
many scholars note that presidential rhetoric both reflects the political landscape and







Another  way   to   consider   those  nineteen  million   territorial   inhabitants   is  as  a
fraction of the U.S. populations. Again taking 1940 as our year, slightly more than
one   in  eight   (12.6  percent)  of  the  people   in  the  United  States   lived  outside  the
states.   For   perspective,   consider   that   only   about   one   in   twelve  was  African-
American.  If  you  lived  in  the  United  States  on  the  eve  of  World  War  II,  in  other
words, you were more likely to be colonized than black, by odds of three to two.81
26 Indeed, as Immerwahr notes, the census was very state-centric and largely downplayed
the  huge  amounts  of   land  and  people   that  constituted  what   some  considered   the
“greater  United  States.”  Given   its  self-avowed  ethos  of  freedom  and   liberty  and  the
attempts to disguise its own imperial actions, it is not surprising that the United States
has  engaged   in  a  collective  act  of  cognitive  dissonance  vis-à-vis  its  own  expansion.
Colley,   therefore,   describes  Americans   as   “disengaged”  with   respect   to  what   she











annexation  of   land.  Part  of  the  confusion  over  empire  generally,  and  the  American
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Nevertheless,  Ferguson  disagrees,  arguing  that  “Doyle’s  thoughtful  definition  is  shot
full of holes…”85 He goes on to discuss the “elusive ideal type”, concluding that:
Whatever one’s ideal-type definition, old and new empires-like sovereign states and
all   other   polities-exhibit   remarkable   variety,   and   the   things   that  make   them
different often are at least as interesting as the things they share. Perhaps, then, it
is  best  to   look  at  “empires”  as  a  continuum,  where  some  polities   fit  the  model
drawn from the “usual suspects” better than others.86 
28 Ferguson’s  commentary  is  especially  useful  for  two  reasons.  First,  it  offers  a  way  of
thinking about empire that recognizes that power, control and empire do not always
come   in   a   standard  package.  Secondly,  when   scholars   and  others   adhere   to  very
inflexible  understandings  of  empire   it  makes   it  easier  politically   for  some   imperial
states   to  decry   their   own   imperial   status,   e.g.,   the  United   States.  How  different,
therefore,   is  such  a  US  disavowal  from  Moscow’s  maskirovka tactics  along  Ukraine’s
borders? 
29 Nonetheless, the literature makes a compelling case that the United States has a formal
empire  and  may  have  evolved  a   significant   informal  empire   too.  By   the  narrower
definitions of formal empire, i.e., one polity taking land from another polity, usually via
conquest,  the  United  States  certainly  qualifies  because  of  its campaigns  against  First
Peoples and others. The Mexican Cessation that followed the Mexican-American War of
1848 also meets this definition. In this case, one republic fought another republic and at
its  conclusion  the   losing  polity,  Mexico,  ceded  huge  swathes  of   its  territory  to  the








their   overseas   colonies,   the  United   States   remains   in  possession   of   a  number   of
overseas territories, notably Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the US Virgin Islands, and
Guam.87 While the United States calls Puerto Rico a “commonwealth” and not a colony,
this   linguistic   sleight  of  hand  does  not  change   the  basic,  and   imperial,   structural
relationship  between  Washington  and   the   island.  Moreover,  American  practices   in
Puerto   Rico,   including   denying   the   commonwealth   Electoral   College   votes,   the
continuance   of   the   Jones  Act   and  Washington’s   lackluster   response   to   a  massive
hurricane that crippled the island in 2017, also strongly suggest that this relationship,
whatever it is called, is distinctly imperial. What is interesting is that many scholars
who  conclude  that  the  United  States   is  not,  and  perhaps  cannot  be  an  empire,  are
examining  the  United  States  after  it  completed   its  westward  expansion  and   after  it
bested  Spain   in  1898.  They  do  not   look  at  territory   in  the   longer  durée  which,   like
France’s Artois, has been under direct US control for a century or more, even if it was
Empire?






empire   in  the  postwar  period  usually  do  not  entail  formal  agreements  and  are   less
definite.89 
31 Using more expansive definitions of empire which include, in addition to conquest, the





aggrandizement   first  and   foremost  by  purchase  or   lease   -  not  conquest.  Moreover,
there had been additional attempts in the 1930s to buy Easter Island from Chile and the




surprising  also   that  given   its  ongoing  possession  of  Puerto  Rico,  American  Samoa,
Guam and the US Virgin Islands the United States is still listed on the UN’s list of Non-
Self-Governing Territories. 
32 For  many  the  staggering  amount  of  power  that  the  United  States  wields  seemingly
makes  it  an  empire  in  the  postwar  era  –  even  if  Washington  is  not  actively  seeking
formal   arrangements   that  meet   the   strict  definition   of   empire.   For  many   in   the
developing world the United States is imperial not because it directly controls territory
but because it wields considerable power. Immerwahr points out that the United States
has   a   formal   empire   but   then   cites  American   economic   power   in   global   affairs,
Washington’s  use  of  military  interventions,  its  network  of  bases,  its  ability  to  create
scientific   and   linguistic   standards   and   its   subjugation   of   African   Americans,   as
additional markers of empire.92 Most common in the work of Critical Studies scholars
this  outcomes-based  conceptualization  of  empire  suggests  that  Washington’s  role   in
international institutions, from the United Nations to the World Bank and International
Monetary   Fund,   coupled  with   the   actions   of   its  private  proxies,   including  multi-
national   corporations,   all   help   the   United   States   to   achieve   imperial   aims   in
unconventional ways. 
 
5. Conclusion and Discussion
33 Several important conclusions emerge from this work. First, and despite some excellent
scholarship on the topic, empire remains under-theorized and somewhat ill-defined. In
a   related   point,   there   are   rather   serious   divergences   that   seem   closely   tied   to
disciplinary training. This divide is reminiscent of Miles’ Law in public administration
which  states,  “Where  you  stand  depends  on  where  you  sit.”  Many,  though  not  all,










Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States,  most  Americans  are  in  a  state  of
denial about their nation’s own imperial status.93 This is perhaps not surprising given
the  myriad  ways in  which  Americans  have  denied  or  attempted,  via euphemism,  to
conceal their empire. Discussing this Schumacher opines, “This omission is in part the









historical  narrative   further  confuse  the  topic  of  American  empire.  And  while  some
might consider the question of empire the worst sort of academic navel gazing it does




United  States  views   itself  as  an  exemplar  of   liberty  but  others  view   it  as  a  very
conventional   empire,   processes   and   outcomes   in   foreign   affairs   are   likely   to   be
muddied   -   at   a  minimum.  Recognizing   a   range   of   diverse   actions   as   potentially
imperialistic  might  also  enable  Washington  to  critique  its  rivals  more  easily  and  see
their  perspective  more  clearly.  How  different,   for  example,   is  the  US’s   leasing  of  a
military base in the Pacific from China’s island-building program in the South China
Seas? 
35 This  work  establishes  that  narrow  definitions  of  empire,  namely  one  polity  gaining
territory   from   another   polity   and   usually   through   conquest,   are   insufficient   in







work  also  suggests  that  the  literature  in  political  science  and  international  relations





ideal  type  of  democracy.  While  there  is  much  ink  spilled  over  defining  the  concept,
scholars from various fields have worked to incorporate new developments, e.g., the
adoption  of  universal  suffrage  as  a  necessary  condition,  into  the  study  of  the  topic.
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Scholars of empire should do the same. The fact that polities have generally stopped







have  some  thirteen  overseas  bases  between  them,  Russia  has  nine,  various  other
countries have one – in all, there are probably thirty overseas bases owned by non-
U.S.  countries.  The  United  States,  by  contrast,  has  roughly  eight  hundred,  plus
agreements granting it access to still other foreign sites. Dozens of countries host
U.S.  bases.  Those  that  refuse  are  nevertheless  surrounded  by  them.  The  Greater
United States, in other words, is in everyone’s back yard.97 
36 The empirical record is clear; there is no contesting that the United States expanded
beyond   its   original   borders   by   conquering   lands  held   by   indigenous  neighbours,




these  polities   in  a   long  durée  arrangement  doesn’t  make   them  any   less   imperial.
Furthermore,   the  United  States  has   fully   incorporated   some   imperial  possessions,
namely  Alaska,  Hawai’i,  and  the  states  that  Washington  “won/purchased”  in  its  war
with Mexico in the 19th century. Admission to the United States does not mean that the
methods of “acquisition” were not imperial. It might be tempting for some to conclude
that  these  acquisitions  and  gains  are  somehow  too   long  past  to  qualify  the  United
States  as  an  empire.  This  work  rejects  that  notion  since  these  processes  are  such  a
critical part of the political and economic development of the United States. 
37 In addition, there is considerable evidence suggesting that Washington sought territory
and   influence   in  ways   that   looked   like   empire   long  after   the   idea  of   trumpeting
imperial   grandeur   seemed   distasteful.   Indeed,   acquiring   and   administering  whole
polities became both unsavory and wildly inefficient. In the Cold War and the decades
that   followed,  Washington   increasingly   relied   on   acquiring   bases   or   other   small
possessions as a means to build imperial networks that gave the United States many of
the advantages of formal empire without bearing the costs, real and psychic, that come
with   being   a  more   traditional   empire   interested   in   occupying   large   amounts   of
territory. This does not mean, of course, that the United States is unwilling to engage in
military interventions that produce quasi-imperial outcomes, e.g., Afghanistan in 2001
and  Iraq  in  2003.  Owing  to  reasons  of  scope,  this  work  does  not  grapple  with  other
alleged   instantiations  of  American  empire,  e.g., globalization  or  cultural  hegemony.
Kramer briefly mentions “structural adjustment” as a marker of this kind of empire in
the context of the post-Soviet era, and connects this to variants of informal empire.98
Westad  also  takes  up  the   less  visible  but  very  real  connections  between  the  United
States, the Soviet Union, and empire during and after the Cold War.99 
38 Nevertheless,   in   the  post-war  era   it  seems   that  Washington   largely  abandoned   the
practice  of   formally  occupying  big   territories.   It  has,  however,   assembled   a   truly
astounding  network  of  military  bases  that  span  the  globe.  Johnson  notes  the  special
role that military bases play when he writes, “This vast network of American bases on
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every  continent  except  Antarctica  actually  constitutes  a  new   form  of  empire   --  an








stated   the  second  Reich.  On  balance,   though,   Johnson’s  point   is  useful.  Cooley  and













overt  forms  of  imperialism  that  involve  occupation,  for  example,  additionally  create  a
host of obligations for the imperial actor, including maintaining some monopoly on the
use of force, providing a degree of infrastructure and basic services and upholding the
area’s   territorial   integrity.   At   the   same   time   most   inhabitants   do   not   welcome
occupation  and   this  often  creates  push  back.  This  resistance   is  often  costly   to   the
imperial   agent.   Thus,   according   to   their   logic,   following   World   War   II   and
decolonization  empires  moved   from   the  overt   to   the   covert.  As  previous   sections
outlined,  the  United  States   is  something  of  a  trailblazer   in  that  Washington  used  a
variety of tactics to disguise its empire during a period when most other states were
busy loudly proclaiming their empires. 
40 This  combination  of  smaller  holdings  and  a  reliance  on  means  other  than  conquest,
some  argue,  have  become  hallmarks  of  more  modern  empires.104 After  all,  there  has
been  a  considerable  shift  in  how  citizens  and  political  elites  value  empire.  Being  an
empire used to be a point of national pride and a goal for rising powers, e.g., Germany
in  the  19th century.  Nevertheless,   in  the  contemporary  period  great  powers  seek  to
avoid  the  label  as  it  is  almost  always  carries  a  negative  connotation.  Shifting  public
opinion and changing contexts aside, this does not fundamentally alter the geopolitical





missiles,  the  Unites  States  needed  platforms.  Bases  and  ships,  not  too   far   from  the
combat zone, were essential. Hence the buildup of a basing network in Saudi Arabia,
especially  at  Dhahran.”105 Immerwahr also  chronicles  the  ease  and speed  with which
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the  United  States  can  find  replacement  bases  when  political  or  security  “blowback”




access  to  foreign  markets.  Hopkins  chronicles  this  sort  of  behavior  in  the  historical








indigenous  voice  either   it   can  at   least  help   to  explain  why   that  voice  have  been
subordinated. Moreover, the American case nicely illustrates the fact that empires can
change  over  time  and  may   include  both   formal  and   informal  parts  simultaneously.
Washington thus has a formal empire that includes areas annexed into the Union, i.e.,
the territories added after independence from Britain. It also has a formal empire that
encompasses  overseas  possessions   that  Washington  has  not  granted   full  and  equal
status, e.g. Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa and Guam. Certainly, it
is   also   true   that   Washington   once   controlled   other   overseas   polities,   e.g.,   the
Philippines,   and   that   it   still  dominates   a   few  of   them   (Hawai’i)   as  well   as  other
continental lands taken by conquest or purchase over the course of the 19th century.
More  contentiously,  some  argue  that  the  United  States  has  evolved  or  co-evolved  a
flourishing  and  sprawling informal empire  which, at  a  minimum,  includes bases  and
islands.   Indeed,   Blower   argues   that   an   “outpost   strategy   appears   as   a   constant
throughout  American  history”,  although   those  outposts  can  vary  between   frontier
trading stations to today’s high-tech listening posts.107 Returning then to the question
of definition and the issue of an American empire, perhaps the best approach is to see
the  phenomenon  of  empire  as   fluid,  one   that  best  employs  the  analogy  of  a  river.
Sometimes empire can be a raging torrent (formal conquest of large spaces by invading





clarify   the  definitional   conundrums  of  empire  we  helpfully   suggest   the   following:
empire is a river even when it is a river no more!
Empire?
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